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Do

EMBRYOS HAvE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS?: DOE V. OBAMA

Scientists can cause stem cells to function as any number of specific types of
cell, and therefore, stem cell research has the potential to yield treatments for
many diseases! l While adult stem cells are somewhat specialized, stem cells
derived from embryos, known as human embryonic stem cells (hESCs), are
pluripotent, which means they are able to transform into nearly any type of cell
in the human body.2 Accordingly, hESCs are highly valuable to scientific
researchers. 3 Generally, embryos that are turned into hESCs are created via in
vitro fertilization (1VF) and donated for stem cell research when they are no
longer needed for reproductive purposes and are not made available for
adoption.4 When researchers create a stem cell line from the embryo, the
embryo is destroyed. 5 Thus, the issue of stem cell research has been
controversial, both within the scientific field and as a moral issue regarding the
role of science in curing disease and preserving life.6 While many believe that
stem cell research is essential to developing cures for certain illnesses, many
others posit that the destruction of a human embryo in the process of creating an
hESC is the equivalent of killing human life, and therefore, researchers should
pursue non-embryonic sources of stem cell research. 7 Accordingly, the issue of
whether the federal government should fund stem cell research has proven
contentious.
The Dickey-Wicker Amendment 9 was passed by Congress and signed by
President Bill Clinton in 1996.10 The Dickey-Wicker Amendment prohibits the
Department of Health and Human Services and the National Institutes of Health
(NIH) from using appropriated federal government funds to create human
embryos for research, or from conducting research in which human embryos are
destroyed or "knowingly subjected to risk of injury or death.""
The
Amendment specifically defines "embryo" to mean "any organism, not protected

1. Sherley v. Sebelius, 610 F.3d 69, 70 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
2.
Sherley v. Sebelius, 644 F.3d 388, 390 (D.C. Cir. 2011). Induced pluripotent adult stem
cells were recently developed. Id.
3.
Doe v. Obama, 631 F.3d 157, 159 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2938 (2011).
4.
Id.
5.
Id.
6.
Id.
7.
Doe v. Obama, 670 F. Supp. 2d 435, 437 (D. Md. 2009), affd, 631 F.3d. 157 (4th Cir.
2011). Former President George W. Bush noted in a statement on August 9, 2001, that diseases that
could
potentially
benefit
from
stem
cell
research
included
"juvenile
diabetes ... Alzheimer's ... Parkinson's ... and spinal cord injuries." President George W. Bush,
Address to the Nation on Stem Cell Research from Crawford, Texas (Aug. 9, 2001), available at
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/200 1/08/20010809-2.html.
8.
Doe, 631 F.3d at 159.
9.
Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-8, Division F, Title V, § 509(a), 123
Stat. 524, 803 (2009).
10. See Doe, 670 F. Supp. 2d at 437.
11. Id.(quoting Omnibus Appropriations Act § 509(a)).
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as a human subject under 45 CFR 46 as of the date of the enactment of this Act,
that is derived by fertilization, parthenogenesis, cloning,2 or any other means
from one or more human gametes or human diploid cells."
On August 9, 2001, President George W. Bush, in an attempt to balance the
potential benefits of stem cell research with moral and ethical concerns, stated
that he would permit federal funding only on stem cell lines from embryos that13
were already destroyed and derived by private or foreign researchers.
Consequently, on June 20, 2007, President Bush issued Executive Order 13435,
which banned federally funded stem cell research on all stem cell lines created
after August 9, 2001.14
President Barack Obama specifically revoked Bush's Executive Order
13435 on March 9, 2009 with his own Executive Order 13505 and a declaration
that "Bush's August 9 statement [is] no longer effective as a statement of
governmental policy.' 5 Executive Order 13505 allowed the NIH to "support
and conduct responsible, scientifically worthy human stem cell research to the
extent permitted by law."' 6 The NIH subsequently issued draft guidelines on
April 23, 2009," and final guidelines on July 7, 2009.18 The NIH Guidelines
explained that researchers could apply for federal funding for new stem cell
lines, provided that the lines are derived from unused IVF embryos donated for
scientifically meritorious research purposes. 19 The NIH Guidelines also
contained specific safeguards that required proper informed consent from the
donor to ensure that the donor would not be unduly influenced into donating the
embryo for research.20
In January 2011, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals decided Doe v.
Obama.21 Doe was filed in Maryland district court as a response to Executive
Order 13505 and the NIH Guidelines.22 The named plaintiffs were Mary Scott
Doe, a human embryo frozen in cryo-preservation in the United States for either
research or adoption, on behalf of herself and those similarly situated; the
National Organization for Embryonic Law (NOEL); and four married couples,
putative future adopters of human embryos. 23 Plaintiffs sought a declaratory

12. Omnibus Appropriations Act § 509(b).
13. Doe, 670 F. Supp. 2d at 437 (citing Bush, supra note 7).
14. Id. (citing Exec. Order No. 13,435, 3 C.F.R. 222 (2007), revoked by Exec. Order No.
13,505, 3 C.F.R. 229 (2009)).
15. Id. at 437-38 (citing Exec. Order No. 13,505, 3 C.F.R. 229, 230 (2009)). President
Obama's Executive Order 13,505 was titled "Removing Barriers to Responsible Scientific Research
Involving Human Stem Cells." Id. (citing Exec. Order No. 13,505, 3 C.F.R. 229, 229 (2009)).
16. Exec. Order No. 13,505, 3 C.F.R. 229, 229 (2009).
17. Doe, 670 F. Supp. 2d at 438.
18. National Institutes of Health Guidelines for Human Stem Cell Research, 74 Fed. Reg.
32,170, 32,170 (July 7, 2009) [hereinafter NIH Guidelines].
19. Doe, 670 F. Supp. 2d at 438; NIH Guidelines, supra note 18, at 32,171.
20. Doe, 670 F. Supp. 2d at 438; NIH Guidelines, supra note 18, at 32,174-75.
21. Doe v. Obama, 631 F.3d 157 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2938 (2011).
22. Id. at 159; 670 F. Supp. 2d at 435, 436-37.
23. Doe, 670 F.Supp. 2d at 436.
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judgment and an injunction, claiming that Executive Order 13505 violated both
the Dickey-Wicker Amendment and the embryos' "constitutional rights to due
process, equal protection, and freedom from involuntary servitude under the
24 The Maryland district court
Fifth, Fourteenth, and Thirteenth Amendments."
25
dismissed the litigation for lack of standing.
Doe and the putative adoptive parents appealed, and the Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeals affirmed the district court.26 The Fourth Circuit cited judicial
restraint, and averred that a court is "not at liberty to resolve every grievance
over government policy, no matter how significant" due to the Article III
limitation that'27 federal courts adjudicate only actual "cases" and
"controversies.
The case-or-controversy constraint encompasses the
To show
requirement that a plaintiff must have standing to bring a claim.
standing, the plaintiff must demonstrate three elements. The first is that he or
she has suffered an "'injury in fact' that is

. .

. concrete and particularized

and.., actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical., 29 The second
requirement is that "the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the
defendant." 30 The final requirement is that the plaintiff must show that it is
likely, not merely speculative, that the injury will be rectified by a decision in the
plaintiffs favor.
The court held that the named plaintiff of the class of frozen embryos could
not prove a sufficiently "concrete and particularized" injury in fact to establish
standing. 32 The plaintiffs contended that the frozen embryos suffered an injury
in fact because Executive Order 13505 and the NIH Guidelines increased the
embryos' risk of being reduced to hESCs. 3 3 However, this was insufficient
under Supreme Court precedent, which requires that "named plaintiffs who
represent a class 'must allege and show that they personally have been injured,
not that injury has been suffered by other, unidentified members of the class to
which they belong and which they purport to represent."34 The court explained
that, without any indication of Doe's "particularized characteristics," there was a
question as to whether Doe herself would actually be used for NIH-funded

24. ld. at 436-37.
25. Id. at 442.
26. Doe, 631 F.3d at 159.
27. Id. at 160 (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
28. Id. (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)).
29. Id. (quoting Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167,
180 (2000)).
30. Id. (quoting Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 180) (internal quotation marks omitted).
31. Id. (quoting Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 181).
32. Id. at 161 (quoting Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 180) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
33. Id. at 160.
34. Id. (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 40 n.20 (1976)) (internal

quotation marks omitted).
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research and not for privately funded research or adoption.3 5 Therefore,
plaintiffs could "not show "that the
f party
t36 seeking review be himself among the
injured," as required for injury in fact.
The Fourth Circuit further held that the injury to Doe could not fairly be
traced to the defendant's challenged actions.37 NIH Guidelines restricted federal
funding to research for hESCs "created using in vitro fertilization for
reproductive purposes and no longer needed for this purpose" and subsequently
"donated by individuals who sought reproductive treatment" and gave informed
consent for the embryos to be used for research. 38 Therefore, the court
determined that the choice of the biological parents to donate the embryos was
an intervening cause of the asserted injury. 39 Although the plaintiffs alleged that

the new policy would be extremely persuasive in the biological parents' decision
to donate the embryos to research, the Fourth Circuit held that this was
insufficient to establish that the injury was fairly traceable to Executive Order
13505 or the NIH Guidelines. 4° Furthermore, the NIH Guidelines addressed the
possibility of undue influence by prohibiting payments for the embryos,
requiring policies and procedures to ensure that the quality of health care is
equal, regardless of the donors' choice, and necessitating a "clear separation"
between the decision to create the embryo and the decision to donate the embryo
to research. 4' Thus, the Fourth Circuit determined that the relationship between
the injury and the challenged Executive Order and NIH Guidelines was "purely
speculative" because the biological parents were given a choice, protected by
certain safeguards to ensure that there was no undue influence, as to whether to
donate the embryos. 42
The Fourth Circuit held that, regardless of its determination that the alleged
injury was not fairly traceable to Executive Order 13505 or the NIH Guidelines,
the putative adoptive parents failed to show injury in fact.43 The putative
adoptive parents alleged that they were considering adopting in vitro human
embryos and that defendants' actions would "reduce the number of IVF-derived
embryos available for adoption." 44 The court concluded that plaintiffs did not

35. Id.
36. Id. at 161 (quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 735 (1972)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
37. Id.
38. Id. (quoting National Institutes of Health Guidelines for Human Stem Cell Research, 74
Fed. Reg. 32,170, 32,174 (July 7, 2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 162 (quoting Brief of Appellants at 43, Doe v. Obama, 631 F.3d 157 (4th Cir. 2011)
(Nos. 10-1104, 10-1106), 201OWL 1048986, at *43.
41. Id. (quoting National Institutes of Health Guidelines for Human Stem Cell Research, 74
Fed. Reg. at 32,174) (internal quotation marks omitted).
42. Id. (quoting Simon v. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 42 (1976)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
43. Id. at 163.
44. Id. at 162 (quoting Brief of Appellants, supra note 40, at 53) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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45
allege sufficient facts to establish that the injury was "actual or imminent."
The Fourth Circuit averred that "'some day' intentions-without any description
of concrete plans, or indeed even any specification of when the some day will
be-do not support a finding of the 'actual or imminent' injury that our cases
require." 46 When a future injury is alleged, the plaintiff must show that there is
"a high degree of immediacy" to establish standing. 47 The Fourth Circuit
implied that if the plaintiffs had tried and failed to adopt embryos, or had
concrete plans for future adoption, they could have been able to establish a
sufficiently imminent injury.48 The court also noted that, like Doe and the class
of frozen embryos, the putative adoptive parents could not establish that the
injury was connected to the Executive Order or the NIH Guidelines.49
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the case for lack
of standing, but noted that its holding was a narrow one. 50 The court explained
that "[a] complaint that provided more concrete information about the identity of
the named plaintiff embryo or the plaintiff parents' plans for adoption would at
least address more directly what the Supreme Court has identified as serious
constitutional concerns." 51 The court concluded by noting that the constitutional
constraints on the role of the federal courts precluded it from hearing a case that
would transform it into a "political organ."52
Notably, the Fourth Circuit never addressed whether embryos can be
plaintiffs at all. The court did explicitly leave open the door for a revised
complaint that could meet the standing requirement. 53 However, the court's
implication that a complaint could be sufficient if the named embryo had more
particularized characteristics to show that the embryo would be used for NIHfunded research sets an impossibly high standard. Although not explicit on the
issue, this decision generally comports with those of the majority of courts,
which have adopted the54 view that an embryo is not a legal person and therefore,
cannot bring a lawsuit.
While the Fourth Circuit was hearing Doe v. Obama, a similar challenge
to Executive Order 13505 and the NIH Guidelines was making its way through
the District of Columbia courts. In Sherley v. Sebelius,55 Dr. James Sherley

45. Id. (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 564 (1992)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
46. Id. at 163 (emphasis in original) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
47. Id. (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 565, n.2) (internal quotation marks omitted).
48. See id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 164.
53. Id. at 163.
54. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973) (the word "person as used in the
Fourteenth Amendment does not include the unborn"); Doe v. Shalala, 862 F. Supp. 1421, 1426 (D.
Md. 1994) ("[E]mbryos are not persons with legally protectable interests.").
55. 776 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2011).
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and Dr. Theresa Deisher, researchers working on an alternative to hESCs,
brought a lawsuit claiming that under the new NIH Guidelines, they would face
increased competition for funding from hESC researchers, and that the NIH
Guidelines violated the Dickey-Wicker Amendment.56 Originally, the case was
dismissed by the U.S. District Court of the District of Columbia for lack of
standing. 57 However, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals reversed
this determination, holding that doctors seeking NIH funding had competitor
standing in this matter to bring a claim concerning the new NIH Guidelines on
stem cell research. 58 The court held that the plaintiff researchers successfully
showed competitor standing by showing an actual or imminent increase in
competition, almost certain to cause an injury in fact. 59 It is also notable that the
only issue addressed by the court as to standing was the issue of whether there
was injury in fact, because, unlike the Doe court, the district court for the District
of Columbia found it was "clear the alleged injury [was] traceable to the
Guidelines and redressable by the court. ''6° On remand, the district court granted
the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, prohibiting hESC research
funding for the duration of the trial court's litigation. 6 The district court
explained that the Dickey-Wicker Amendment is unambiguous in prohibiting
62
federal funding of any research in which an embryo is destroyed. The district
court further stated that research involving destruction of embryos and research
using already destroyed embryos were indistinguishable because the research
"necessarily depends on the destruction of a human embryo.'

63

However, on

April 29, 2011, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that
the federal funding of embryonic stem cell64research is permissible and not a
violation of the Dickey-Wicker Amendment.
Although Sherley held that hESC research under the NIH Guidelines was not
violative of the Dickey-Wicker Amendment, Sherley did not address the
potential violations of the embryos' constitutional rights under the Fifth,
Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendments claimed in Doe. Furthermore, Sherley
explicitly held as to standing that the injury was fairly traceable to the
defendants' actions, directly contradicting the standing analysis applied in Doe.

56. Id. at 8, 9 (quoting Sherley v. Sebelius, 610 F.3d 69, 74 (D.C. Cir. 2010)).
57. Id.at 4.
58. Sherley, 610 F.3d at 74, 75. The court of appeals affirmed dismissal for lack of standing
as to plaintiffs Embryos, Nightlight Christian Adoptions, putative adoptive parents, and Christian
Medical Association. Sherley v. Sebelius, 704 F. Supp. 2d 63, 66 (D.D.C. 2010) (citing Sherley,
610 F.3d at 71), vacated, 644 F.3d 388, 390 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
59. Sherley, 610 F.3d at 74.
60. Id. at 72.
61. Sherley, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 73.
62. Id. at 70-71.
63. Id. at 71.
64. Sherley v. Sebelius, 644 F.3d 388, 390 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
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On July 25, 2011, the Doe v. Obama petition for rehearing was denied by the
United States Supreme Court.65 However, because of the contentious nature of
hESC research and the failure of the Fourth Circuit to explicitly exclude embryos
as plaintiffs with standing, the door remains open for future cases challenging
Executive Order 13505 and the NIH Guidelines. Ultimately, the questions of
whether the NIH Guidelines and the Executive Order violate the constitutional
rights of a frozen embryo under the Fifth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth
Amendment, and more broadly, whether a frozen embryo could ever bring a
claim alleging infringement of constitutional rights, remain unanswered.
Sara L Salehi

65.

Doe v. Obama, 131 S. Ct. 2938 (2011).
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